Constitutional Law Symposium - Racial Gerrymandering by Amdur, Linda S.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 51
Issue 2 Seventh Circuit Review Article 13
October 1974
Constitutional Law Symposium - Racial
Gerrymandering
Linda S. Amdur
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation




Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago,
503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974)
"Legislators represent people, not trees or acres." 1  Legislators
are elected by individuals with points of view and opinions; they are not
elected by districts and territories drawn on maps. Without detailed analysis
of the concept of representation, reapportionment cases have generally been
treated as right to vote cases and have focused on "individual voter weight."'2
Mathematical exactitude of equal representation does not necessarily mean
fair representation. 3  Voters may be more interested in being effectively
represented than in a mathematically equal vote. If the voters of a partic-
ular ethnic or racial group are districted in a manner that gives them no
substantial voting strength in any district, their votes may be counted equally
with other votes, but their viewpoint may remain unrepresented by any given
legislator. In Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago,4 a coalition
of blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicago aldermen, and various organizations con-
tended that the defendant City Council had been invidiously discriminatory
in its redistricting of city wards. The plaintiffs did not allege that the wards
contained unequal numbers of voters. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the apportionment of wards by the defendant did not consti-
tute purposeful or invidious racial or ethnic discrimination and thus was valid.
This article will analyze the two-prong approach posited by the court
in the Cousins decision, which included consideration of racial motivation
surrounding the redistricting and consideration of racial or ethnic discrimina-
tion in fact. First, United States Supreme Court decisions concerning racial
gerrymandering will be reviewed. The Supreme Court has set forth certain
criteria which must be met to bring a redistricting plan within the scope of
constitutionality. Second, the Cousins decision will be summarized. Be-
cause the Cousins decision was the second appeal from a case heard in the
district court, the decision can best be understood in light of the previous
appeal. Finally, the reasoning of the decision and its outcome will be
evaluated in light of the mandates of the United States Supreme Court and
decisions of other federal courts.
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
2. Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny,
1973 S. Or. REV. 1, 2 [hereinafter cited as Casper].
3. Halpin and Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern State Legislative
Redistricting, 22 J. PuB. LAW 37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Halpin].
4, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974).
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THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,5 a state statute which singled out "a readily
isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment ' 6
was said to violate the fifteenth amendment guarantee of the right to vote.
Two years later the United States Supreme Court announced in Baker v.
Carr7 that numerical voter malapportionment by a state legislature can con-
stitute a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. After Baker v. Carr racial districting of a given voting populaton
has been said to infringe on fourteenth amendment rights.8 The United
States Supreme Court since Baker v. Carr has found inherent in the concept
of fair representation under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment two propositions: (1) In apportionment schemes one man's
vote should equal another man's vote as nearly as practicable," and (2)
assuming substantial equality of votes, an apportionment scheme must not
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial elements of
the voting population. 10
Most litigation in the Supreme Court concerning the diluting or can-
celling out of racial voter strength has involved multi-member districts, or
the at-large election scheme." The primary objection to an at-large elec-
tion scheme' 2 is that it provides the dominant party or faction an opportunity
to win all of the seats within a district. This defect is particularly acute and
has serious constitutional dimensions in a racially polarized political system. 13
However, the Supreme Court has not always found invalid multi-member
5. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
6. Id. at 346.
7. 369 U.S. 189 (1962).
8. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971); Kilgarin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 78
(1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 959
(1964).
9. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Arvey v. Midland Co., 390 U.S.
474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10. Cases cited supra note 8.
11. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 78 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433
(1965).
12. In an at-large election scheme, the multi-member district, which is usually a
large district, would elect a number of legislators for some office such as state senator.
In contrast, single-member districts would each elect only one state senator. The effect
of the multi-member district is to permit a faction of voters, if constituting the majority,
to elect all of the state senators from that multi-member district. If the same multi-
member district were divided into single districts where other factions predominate, state
senators representing the other factions may be elected. Thus, an election scheme in-
volving single-member districts permits the election of legislators representing various
factions.
13. Parker, County Redistricting in Mississippi: Case Studies in Racial Gerry-
mandering, 44 Miss. L.J. 391, 393 (1973) [hereinatfer cited as Parker].
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election districts when it is indicated that the state's preference for such dis-
tricts was not rooted in racial discrimination and has no directly provable
racial effect.14
Although the votes of an ethnic group may be cancelled by multi-mem-
ber districts, they may also be diluted in a single-member district by redis-
tricting plans which have been described as "cracking," "packing," and "stack-
ing."' 15 The "cracked" district is an area of heavy racial concentration frag-
mented into separate pieces. 16 The various pieces are then attached to other
neighboring districts of low racial concentration. The outcome is new dis-
tricts, none of which contains a high racial concentration. The Supreme Court
has never explicitly found so-called "cracked" districting unconstitutional.
It has implied that a scheme of this type which follows a "long 'history' of
bias and franchise dilution in the State's traditional drawing of district lines
may be unconstitutional."' 17 The "packed" district is one into which minority
voters are concentrated, thus containing many more minority members than
neighboring districts.' 8 The minority population may be so high, that it could
influence the outcome in a number of neighboring districts if it were not con-
centrated into only one district. In Wright v. Rockefeller,'" a statute pro-
vided for this type of apportionment of congressional districts in New York
County, but the Court held -that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
New York Legislature was either motivated by racial considerations or had
in fact drawn districts on racial lines. A "stacked" district usually lacks
compactness, and has been said to resemble "nothing more than the partisan
rapacious soul of its political creator." 20  A "stacked" district is frequently
drawn to include certain neighborhoods or the residence of an incumbent who
is seeking office. A "stacked" district is not per se violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution unless it is statistically malapportioned
or proven to be invidiously discriminatory.21,
Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago
On December 20, 1970, the plaintiffs filed their original complaint
attacking the redistricting of the city wards. The plaintiffs included a num-
14. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
15. Parker, supra note 13, at 402. These terms were first coined in the context
of under-representation of urban areas in Tyler, Court versus Legislature: The Socio-
Politics of Malapportionment, 27 LAW AND CoNTEMP. PROB. 390, 400 (1962) [herein-
after cited as Tyler].
16. Parker, supra note 13, at 403.
17. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.3 (1972).
18. Parker, supra note 13, at 403.
19. 376 U.S. 959 (1964).
20. Tyler, supra note 15, at 401.
21. WMCA v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per curiam,
382 U.S. 4 (1965).
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ber of aldermen,2 2 a candidate for alderman,23 two unincorporated volun-
tary organizations, 24 a number of black persons, 25 and one person of Puerto
Rican origin and ancestry. 26 The gravamen of -the plaintiffs' argument was
that boundaries were drawn to accomplish the following:
(1) minimize the number of wards in which the majority would
be black;
(2) minimize the number of wards in which the majority would
be independent voters; and
(3) avoid having any ward in which the majority would be Puerto
Rican.
On January 22, 1971, the district court entered its judgment2 7 in which it
determined that no plaintiff claimed an injury or impairment of an individual
right, and hence no plaintiff had standing to bring the cause of action. The
district court also found that the ordinance establishing the boundaries was
not racially, ethnically, or otherwise discriminatory and thus not violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court. 28  The court
concluded that the plaintiffs, who were black and Puerto Rican, had suffi-
cient standing as individual members of their respective groups, against
which discrimination was allegedly directed. The court acknowledged that
some blacks and Puerto Ricans in Chicago probably favored defendant's
map, but noted the fact that "members of an alleged class are opposed to
the claim is irrelevant."' 29  The court determined, however, that the dis-
crimination against the so-called "independent voters" was a non-justiciable
political question. It was unable to find that plaintiffs' evidence clearly
established that the ward boundaries were the product of purposeful racial
or ethnic discrimination. The Seventh Circuit did find that the type of
rights under consideraton required "special care"30 and thus claims of im-
pairment needed a full inquiry and remanded the case for a full trial on -the
merits.
The district court in the second trial held that the evidence established
that the City Council's map complied fully with principles of equality of
22. William Cousins, Jr., A.A. Rayner, Jr., Leon M. Despres, William Singer, and
George Barr McCutcheon.
23. Graciano Lopez.
24. Independent Voters of Illinois and Committee for an Effective City Council.
25. William Cousins, Jr., A.A. Rayner, Jr., Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, Rosemary Gul-
ley, Rev. Richard Lawrence, Timuel P. Black, Jr., and Andrew Crout.
26. Graciano Lopez.
27. Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago, 322 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
28. 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1974).
29. Id. at 845.
30. Id. at 845.
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representation except in one ward. 31 The district court found that one ward
had been drawn intentionally to create a white majority where a black ma-
jority previously existed. The district court deemed it sufficient to redraw
the boundary between two wards so that -the ward, containing a white ma-
jority on defendant's map, became a word which was 52 per cent black.
On the second appeal the court failed to find any inference of purpose-
ful minimization of voting strength of minority racial or ethnic groups in
the overall map of the fifty wards.8 2 It did not find invidious discrimina-
tion in the drawing of the one ward that was redistricted by the district court
or in any other specific wards. The court also did not accept the plaintiffs'
contention that the voting strength of the Spanish-language groups had been
diluted. Finally, the court affirmed the the district court's allocation of
the burden of proving discrimination in fact to the plaintiff rather than plac-
ing the "burden of justification" '38 on the defendant.
EVALUATION OF THE Cousins DECISION
The Inference of Purposeful Discrimination in the
Overall Redistricting Plan
The court in the first Cousins appeal took the position that in light of
the special rights involved, it would allow the plaintiffs an additional oppor-
tunity to prove their case on remand to the federal district court. The court
took judicial notice that, according to revised census figures, 32.7 per cent
of the population of Chicago was black. The fifteen wards in which a
majority of -the residents are black elect 30 per cent of the city's aldermen.
Sixteen wards could elect 32 per cent, and seventeen wards could elect 34
per cent. The court noted that the transcript of the proceedings in the City
Council on its face suggested only an attempt to create wards of equal popula-
tion. However, considerable evidence had been introduced in the district
court demonstrating racial motivation in the preparation of an earlier, confi-
dential version of a proposed city map. The court made the following
comment concerning -this map:
Although we are convinced that -the district court took a clearly
erroneous view of -the Bell-student map project [the confidential
map] and thus failed to consider important elements of plaintiffs'
case, we are unable to say that the plaintiffs' case was so clearly
established that the ward boundaries were the product of purpose-
ful discrimination as to permit this court so to find.3 4
The court stated that it could remand to the district court for the limited
purpose of demonstrating whether following an objective standard rationally
31. Cousins v. City Council of City of Chicago, 361 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
32. 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974).
33. Id. at 16.
34. 466 F.2d at 843.
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related to redistricting, plaintiffs could produce a map with more than fif-
teen wards with a clear majority of blacks or Puerto Ricans. The court,
however, concluded that the proper forum for resolution of the issues would
be the federal district court for a second trial on the merits.
In similar cases in the Fifth District, the court of appeals has shown
no special concern in giving plaintiffs a second opportunity to prove their
case by demonstrating racial motivation and presenting their own maps. In
Howard v. Adams County Board of Supervisors,3 5 the Fifth Circuit approved
a county-wide redistricting plan in which blacks would be in a majority in
only one out of five districts, although the black to white ratio was one to
one in the county. The blacks thus had the population strength to pre-
dominate in at least two districts. The court in Howard maintained that
plaintiffs must prove (1) a racially motivated plan or (2) that the apportion-
ment scheme would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
of racial elements of the voting population. 36 The record was said to be
bare of racial motivation or purpose. The court maintained that there was
no impermissible dilution of voting strength although the five districts con-
tained the following percentages of blacks: 67, 45, 40, 40, and 10. The
important distinction between Howard and the first Cousins appellate de-
cision was that the court in Cousins was prepared to make additional inquiry
because the rights considered were deemed to require "special care."'3 7 In
the first Cousins decision, the overall figures of defendant's redistricting did
not appear grossly unfair. Blacks predominated in fifteen wards, but theo-
retically could have predominated in sixteen. In Howard, on the other hand,
blacks could theoretically predominate in two or three districts, but pre-
dominated in only one. The finding in the Cousins appellate decision was
not simply based on the overall figures but on a second inquiry into racial
motivation and a consideration of a map designed by plaintiffs. Although
in Howard discrepancies were initially apparent, the Fifth Circuit showed no
special concern in remanding for further proceedings.
In Taylor v. McKeithen,3 8 the Fifth Circuit approved a redistricting
plan prepared by "interested state senators '3 9 over one prepared by a mas-
ter appointed by the district court. The geographical -area in issue concerned
four districts. After finding the state's self-reapportionment plan violative
of the equal protection clause, the district court appointed a master to pre-
pare a plan. The trial court instructed the master to hold hearings and
then draw districts that would be "as uniform and rational as possible." '4 0
35. 453 F.2d 455 (5th Cr. 1972).
36. Id. at 457.
37. 466 F.2d at 843.
38. 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 894,
40. Id. at 894, n.1,
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In the master's plan, black voters would predominate in two districts, and
black population would also clearly predominate in the same two districts.
In the "interested state senators'" plan, black voters would predominate in
none of the districts although black population would predominate in one
district. The Fifth Circuit in Taylor reversed the district court in approv-
ing the state senators' plan.
The court in Taylor maintained that blacks under the state senators'
plan had a greater opportunity to have their voting power felt. The black
population was more uniform under the state senators' plan, i.e. about 43
per cent in three of the districts, and black voter registration was said to
be on a rapid increase. In addition, the court noted that whites were more
inclined to vote for blacks than blacks for whites. The court then reasoned
that a senate district having 43-45 per cent black population in 1971 could
elect a black senator in 1975. In the district court in Taylor, the plaintiffs
had presented maps, which as the trial judge said "merely show that plans
could be presented which are within acceptable deviation limits while at
the same time giving negro voters an even greater voter strength than does
the court-approved plan."'41  The Fifth Circuit saw "no purpose to be
served by remanding the case for the district court to construct a 'least dras-
tic alternative.' "42 The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has placed extra-
ordinary emphasis on allowing plaintiffs an adequate chance to show dilu-
tion of racial voting power by the use of plaintiffs' own maps and evidence
of defendant's racial motivation.
The court noted that purposeful minimization of the voting strength
of a minority racial or ethnic group is the sort of conduct which is unlikely
to be directly or specifically proven. The second Cousins decision in effect
used both an objective test (a map test) and a motivation test. The court
purported to rely upon the map test. In actuality, it also considered racial
motivation.
The map test which the court used in finding no inference of purpose-
ful dilution of minority voting strength in the defendant's map was sum-
marized in a footnote:
One approach, where such a claim is made is to compare the num-
ber of black minority wards in the challenged map with another
map which might equally reasonably be drawn, but with more such
wards, and assess whether the difference is more probably explained
by a purpose to discriminate than by legitimate considerations. 43
41. Id. at 899.
42. Id. at 897. One of the Fifth Circuit's reasons for considering remand unneces-
sary was that a black had been elected from a district which the trial court had described
as a safe white district. However, the Fifth Circuit apparently assumed that the electing
of a black candidate from a given district was proof of the fact that black interests would
be represented.
43. 503 F.2d at 914, n.1.
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The plaintiffs' map produced sixteen wards with a majority of blacks;
the defendant's map produced fifteen wards with a majority of blacks.
The court in the second Cousins appeal thus refused to find any inference
of purposeful dilution of racial or ethnic voting strength in the defendant's
overall map based upon a comparison with the alternative map introduced
by plaintiffs.
The court of appeals in the second Cousins decision not only used the
map test, but also considered the findings of the trial court concerning
racial motivation. Evidence of racially oriented conversations between
aldermen concerning preparation of the map was introduced in both the
first and second trials. The court in the first Cousins decision did not simply
remand for the limited purpose of allowing plaintiffs -to produce a map
with more predominantly black or Puerto Rican wards. The court may
well have ordered a complete new trial for more complete consideration of
the comments surrounding the confidential map, which was constructed in
an alderman's private office prior to the drawing of the official map in City
Council. The court in its first decision did indeed state that the trial court
failed to consider an important part of plaintiffs' case by not placing more
emphasis on the preparation of the confidential map. Nonetheless, the
district court in the second trial simply did not find evidence that the de-
fendant's map was racially motivated.
The second Cousins decision followed the guidelines set down by the
Supreme Court in considering both racial motivation and a map test. In
Wright v. Rockefeller,44 the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff failed to
prove either that the legislature was motivated by racial considerations or
that it in fact drew districts on racial lines. In Fortson v. Dorsey,45 the
Supreme Court set forth what could be termed an objective -test to determine
whether invidious discrimination in racial gerrymandering exists. Violations
of the equal protection clause were said to occur only if it can be shown
that "designedly or otherwise, [an] . . . apportionment scheme . . . would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting population. ' 46  The Seventh
Circuit followed Wright by considering the findings of the trial court con-
cerning racial motivation. In addition, it followed Wright by using a map
prepared by the plaintiffs to determine if the defendant's redistricting plan
was in fact drawn along racial lines. By the use of plaintiffs' map, the
court of appeals in the second Cousins decision also implemented what could
be termed an objective map test. In essence, the court allowed plaintiffs
to prepare a map "which might equally reasonably be drawn,' 47 and then
44. 376 U.S. 959 (1964).
45. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
46. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 78, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439 (1965).
47. 503 F.2d at 914, n.1.
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compared plaintiff's map with defendant's to determine whether defendant's
map diluted racial and ethnic vote.
In the second Cousins decision, the plaintiffs objected to the burden
of proof applied in the district court. The plaintiffs contended that the
district court should have shifted to the defendant the burden of establish-
ing the absence of discrimination following the plaintiffs' introduction of
historical and statistical evidence of a pattern of bias. The plaintiffs argued
that the district court should have applied the "strict scrutiny" 48 test formu-
lated in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.
If, as previous decisions have indicated, strict scrutiny means that
the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of vali-
dity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a
'heavy burden of justification,' that the State must demonstrate that
its [legislation] has been structured with 'precision,' and is 'tailored'
narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the
'less drastic means' for effectuating its objectives.49
The plaintiffs in effect contended that the district court should have placed
the burden of justifying the 1970 reapportionment ordinance on the de-
fendant City Council.
The court in Cousins noted that the Supreme Court has not shifted
the burden of proof in similar cases -to the defendant. Although funda-
mental constitutional concerns about racial discrimination would appear
to be involved in racial gerrymandering cases, the plaintiffs were unable
to cite any decision in which the Rodriguez strict scrutiny test was applied.
Furthermore, in Whitcomb v. Chavis,50 the Supreme Court maintained that
the "challenger (must) carry the burden of proving that multi-member
districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength
of racial . . . elements." 51  The Supreme Court has affirmed a number
of district court decisions, involving both multi-member and single-member
districts, in which no burden of justification was placed upon the state. 52
The Supreme Court has nonetheless noted that Whitcomb would not con-
trol where there was no concession that the state's preference for a certain
type of districting was not rooted in racial discrimination. 53  The Supreme
Court has not indicated to what extent Whitcomb would not control. Thus,
it has not made a precise statement for cases involving no such concession
or in cases concerning a long history of bias. Where a redistricting map
has been found violative of the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court
48. id. at 922.
49. 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
50. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
51. Id. at 145.
52. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Kilgarim v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120
(1967); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
53. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 .3 (1972),
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has affirmed a district court decision which allocated the burden to the
plaintiffs to establish a dilution of voting strength of racial and ethnic minori-
ties. 54  Consequently, the conclusion of the second Cousins appellate de-
cision, which affirmed the trial court's allocation of the burden of proof
cannot be said to be inconsistent with previous Supreme Court holdings.
While the second Cousins decision follows the Supreme Court's man-
dates in placing the burden of proof on plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has
not gone without criticism for its position in this regard. 55 Although states
must carry the burden of justifying any population variations in their dis-
tricting plans, the burden of proof in cases of racial vote dilution rests with
the plaintiffs, and such proof has in fact been a substantial burden.56 Mr.
Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Wright, suggested that the defendant's map
established a justifiable inference of legislative intent to draw congressional
district lines on the basis of race.57 More importantly, he suggested that a
justifiable inference was sufficient to raise a rebuttable presumption of un-
constitutionality and to place on the state the burden of going forward and
introducing rebuttal evidence. 58 The Supreme Court has never accepted
Mr. Justice Goldberg's position, and to date political representation has not
been equated with the fundamental right of actual participation in the
elective process-voting.
Packing of Black Population into a Single Ward
Although the district court in the second Cousins trial did not find
the overall reapportionment to be the product of invidious racial or ethnic
discrimination, it did find such discrimination in the boundaries of one ward.
The type of alleged gerrymandering of which the plaintiffs complained could
be described as "packing." A boundary separated two wards, one of which
contained 26.9 per cent blacks and the other 77.8 per cent blacks. Because
of the compactness of the two wards drawn by the defendant City Council,
the court of appeals reversed the district court. The district court concluded
that the two wards were drawn with the invidious purpose of minimizing
black voting strength. This conclusion was based in part on the finding that
if the boundaries had remained substantially similar to the 1961 boundaries,
blacks would have remained in a majority in both wards. The court of ap-
peals found that the evidence supported the conclusion that the boundaries
were responses to legitimate concerns such as compactness of wards and
equality of population. Compactness of wards in the City of Chicago is re-
quired by statute.59 Case law in Illinois has defined "compactness" as
54. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
55. Halpin, supra note 3. Cox, Foreward-Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 8 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966).
56. Halpin, supra note 3, at 41.
57. 376 U.S. at 72.
58. Id. at 73.
59. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 21-36 (1973).
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"closely united," and has recognized the requirement of compactness as a
protection against so-called "gerrymandering." 60 The court acknowledged
that determination of the boundaries was partially influenced by the desire to
keep an incumbent alderman in an allegedly diluted district. In this regard
the United States Supreme Court has stated that the "fact that district boun-
daries may have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests
between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidious-
ness."'61
The one decision in which the Supreme Court has considered an alleged-
ly "packed" redistricting plan was Wright. The plaintiffs offered maps, statis-
tics and some oral evidence to prove that it was impossible to have the four
congressional districts in question so drawn without regard to race. The per-
centages of blacks and Puerto Ricans in the four districts were 86.3, 28.5,
27.5, and 5.1. The district court held that no proof was offered that spe-
cific boundaries were drawn on racial lines or that the legislature was mo-
tivated by racial considerations. The Court noted that the concentration of
black and Puerto Rican voters in one area made it difficult to fix districts so
as to have an equal division of voters among the districts.
As in Wright, the court in Cousins was confronted with a map in which
blacks were clearly concentrated into one district. The Supreme Court has
made this permissible where it would be difficult to draw wards in any other
manner. The court in Cousins noted that the ward in question and the sur-
rounding wards were compactly drawn and thus concluded that the boundary
separating the 26.9 per cent black ward and the 77.8 per cent black ward did
not constitute invidious discrimination.
Diluting the Voting Strength of the Spanish-language Group
The plaintiffs on appeal did not press their initial contention that the
voting strength of the Puerto Rican population had been purposefully dim-
inished. The court of appeals, nonetheless, commented on the district court's
determination of this question. The district court concluded that there were
only 49,500 Puerto Ricans scattered over an area consisting of -three or
four wards and that it would be impossible to create a Puerto Rican majority
in any single ward. The court of appeals maintained that the finding of no
purposeful diminution of Puerto Rican voting was not clearly erroneous. The
court noted that if the 1961 boundaries had been retained, one ward would
have been 32 per cent Puerto Rican, while under the new plan it was 25 per
cent Puerto Rican.
The plaintiffs in the second trial had not only argued in terms of the
Puerto Rican population but sought to broaden the minority group being
60. People v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307, 315 (1895).
61. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 78, 89 n.16 (1966).
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considered to that of the Spanish-language group. The Spanish-language
group constituted 80,000 and contained an unknown number of aliens.
Under the plaintiffs' map, a ward was created containing 42 per cent Span-
ish-language group. Under the defendant's map the most substantial Span-
ish-language minority comprised only 33 per cent of the population of a ward.
The court was not persuaded by the argument that there had been a dilution
of the Spanish-speaking vote.
The district court rejected plaintiffs' argument because of plaintiffs'
failure to amend -their complaint and to add a named plaintiff representing
the Spanish-language group. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court in this regard. In adopting this position, the court suggested that the
merits of this portion of the case could have been considered if the plaintiffs
had only followed the proper procedure. It is significant that courts are
prepared to consolidate minorities even though they have no common origin.
In Wright, neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the district court,
objected to grouping blacks and Puerto Ricans. Although the second
Cousins decision is consonant with the Supreme Court in this regard, the
validity of the court's opinion in this area is somewhat tenuous. An under-
lying assumption in all cases concerning purposeful dilution of ethnic voting
is that the members of a single ethnic or minority group will vote substan-
tially the same way. This assumption alone could be questioned, but an even
more questionable assumption is that members of different minorities (blacks,
Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans) will exhibit a similar voting pattern.
Although in Wright the plaintiffs ultimately lost on -the merits of their case,
the Court set a precedent for the grouping of minorities.
The court in the second Cousins decision in dicta stated that it was not
persuaded by the fact that the plaintiffs' map created one ward with 42 per
cent Spanish-speaking population and -the defendant's map created a ward
with 33 per cent. The court implied that it was unpersuaded because the so-
called Spanish-speaking language group contained a number of aliens. If
this is the reasoning behind the court's position, it is simply stating that the
figures of 42 per cent and 33 per cent are meaningless. Possibly the
difference of 9 per cent was simply not significant to the court. It is also
possible that the court was unpersuaded because the Spanish-speaking group
could not constitute a majority in any ward. The Fifth Circuit in Howard
v. Adams County Board of Supervisors rejected any notion that a minority
group is entitled to a districting plan in which it can predominate in specifc
districts simply because it commands a population concentration of suffi-
cient size. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Whitcomb has
rejected the contention -that a multi-member districting plan is invalid simply
because a given group with distinctve interests is compact enough and nu-
merous enough to predominate in a single-member district. In actuality, the
court in the second Cousins decision has made no definitive statement ex-
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plaining the type of redistricting that would violate the equal protection
clause by "cracking" a given segment of minority population.
CONCLUSION
Although the court in the first and the second Cousins decisions did give
special consideration to the rights involved, the plaintiffs were nonetheless
unable to prove their case. One of the difficulties that confronted the
plaintiffs was that the Supreme Court has in essence made proof of invidious
discrimination of ethnic or racial voter strength a distinctly arduous task. The
prevention of gerrymandering, especially for racial purposes, is a central con-
cern of critics, who demand that the Supreme Court develop more effective
standards to invalidate such practices. 62 While states must carry the burden
of justifying any population variances in their plans, the burden of proof
in racial gerrymander cases has to date rested with the plainitffs. 63 The
Seventh Circuit has followed the Supreme Court in allocating that burden of
proof to the plaintiffs. If the Seventh Circuit had placed the burden of just-
ifying the 1970 reapportionment ordinance on the defendant, an entirely
different result may have been reached. The Seventh Circuit could have
shifted to the defendant the burden of justifying its ordinance by applying the
strict scrutiny -test recently formulated in Rodriguez. In other words, the
court of appeals could have required the state to carry a "heavy burden of
justification," and demonstrate that its legislation is "tailored" narrowly to
serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the "less drastic means"
for effectuating its objectives. 64 Consideration of racial motivation and ob-
jective map tests have not proven to be effective standards in preventing
invidious discrimination in racial gerrymandering. Shifting the burden of
justification of legislation to the defendants could be a more effective means
of assuring protection of the special rights involved in the redistricting of
racial and ethnic voter strength.
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